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Econometrics, Vol. 48, No. 5 (July, 1980) 
ON THE FORMAL THEORY OF INSPECTION AND EVALUATION 

IN PRODUCT MARKETS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WHILETHE OVERALL IMPORTANCE of drawing a distinction between information 
concerning characteristics of goods which are directly observable and information 
concerning characteristics of goods which cannot be observed without actual 
"consumption" in some appropriate sense has just begun to be realized, labor 
economists have implicitly been making use of the distinction for some time. For 
example, researchers studying labor mobility in the early fifties such as Reynolds 
[9] emphasized that high job turnover by young workers could be explained in 
part as a kind of job-shopping. More recently, Pencavel [7] has used the notion 
that all characteristics of jobs cannot be observed by simply sampling firms as the 
basis for an equilibrium model of job quits, and Wilde [lo] has explored optimal 
search strategies when jobs are characterized by multiple characteristics, some 
of which are directly observable and others of which cannot be observed without 
actually taking the job. 
Besides these applications to the quit-rate, the distinction between different 
kinds of information can be used to analyze a number of economic phenomenon, 
both in the labor market and in other markets characterized by imperfect and 
costly information. Stiglitz [8] has applied it to the economic theory of screening 
and education, and Nelson [6] has used it in a unique approach to consumer 
behavior in product markets. 
Nelson partitions goods into two classes: search goods and experience goods. 
The distinction between the two classes is drawn in terms of the consumer's 
preferred mode of evaluating the potential stream of utility yielded by purchasing 
a good. For search goods the evaluation occurs prior to purchase; that is, a 
decision to purchase the good is based only on price (and other directly observable 
characteristics), not on any unobservable qualitative features of the product. 
Experience goods are those for which the primary information process used to 
evaluate the potential utility of a purchase is actual consumption of the good. 
This paper is rcotivated in part by Nelson's work but, unlike it, the focus is 
directly on individual characteristics as opposed to total packages of charac- 
teristics. That is, two classes of characteristics are defined. Search characteristics 
are those which can be observed without actually consuming the good, and 
experience characteristics are those which cannot be observed without consump- 
tion. Investment in information about search characteristics will be called inspec- 
tion, as suggested by Hirshleifer [I], and investment in information about 
experience characteristics will be called evaluation. 
To see the difference between this approach and Nelson's, suppose a good is 
described by a vector of characteristics (xl, x2, . . . ,x,). Nelson implicitly assumes 
I would like to thank Robert Forsythe and Bill Rogerson for extremely helpful discussions of this 
material. An anonymous referee also provided useful comments on an earlier draft. 
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each value xi is potentially observable prior to purchase and that the consumer 
must choose between paying a "search cost" and observing allxi prior to purchase 
or paying the purchase price and observing all xi by direct consumption. This 
strong dichotomy leads to some contradictions though. For an example consider 
experience goods. Since an experience good is evaluated by direct consumption, 
the good must actually be purchased. But by definition, price cannot effect the 
decision concerning which good to buy. Thus for experience goods Nelson 
assumes "consumers either sample at random from among all brands or from 
those brands in the price range the consumer deems appropriate for himself." This 
implicitly requires the further assumption that the consumer either ignores price 
altogether or has perfect information about price and is imperfectly informed only 
about qualitative characteristics of the good. 
There are several ways to avoid these logical difficulties. In keeping with the 
spirit of Nelson's definitions, one can assume each characteristic xi is potentially 
observable by paying a characteristic-specific search cost, ci. The consumer draws 
goods at random and observes at least price. Subsequently he or she can either buy 
the good, observe more characteristics prior to purchase, or reject the good and 
draw a new observation. This is essentially the kind of problem analyzed by 
MacQueen [4]. Nelson's search goods and experience goods are special cases in 
this model; search goods are those for which all characteristics (xl, x2, . . . ,x,,) are 
necessarily observed prior to purchase (at cost equal to the sum of all ci, i = 
1, . . . ,n),  and experience goods are those for which only price is observed prior to 
purchase (and, furthermore, all prices are acceptable). 
The point of departure of this paper is to consider goods for which a subset of 
the characteristic-specific search costs are infinite. In particular, it will be assumed 
that goods can be described by two characteristics, price and quality, with price 
being directly observable but quality being observable only by consumption of the 
good. A crucial difference between the model developed in this paper and 
MacQueen's model is that the former allows for repeat purchases as part of an 
optimal search strategy while the latter does not. In the absence of repeat 
purchases it is meaningless to talk about experience goods. 
The next section of this paper defines the search environment for this problem. 
Section 3 then sets up the dynamic programming problem faced by the consumer, 
derives the relevant functional equation, and establishes conditions under which 
there is a unique reservation price. Section 4 develops some specific properties of 
the optimal policy for the general case. In particular, it is shown that one of the 
following situations applies for any given level of search costs; (i) all prices and all 
qualities are acceptable; (ii) all prices are acceptable but some quality levels will be 
rejected; acceptable quality is a function of observed price; (iii) some prices are 
rejected as well as some qualicy levels; acceptable quality remains a function of 
price; or (iv) only the lowest price is acceptable; some quality levels are rejected. 
Corollary to this categorization is the observation that there are no search goods in 
the sense that Nelson uses that term (if price matters then quality must matter for 
some prices) and experience goods exist only when search costs (for observing 
prices) are zero. Section 5 considers a special model which allows one to derive 
comparative statics with respect to changes in the lifetime of the good. It is argued 
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there that a "price-compensated"2 increase in durability lowers both the reser- 
vation price and reservation qualities, causing a shift away from evaluation and 
towards inspection. A final section discusses and summarizes the results obtained. 
2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
The problem analyzed in this paper is set in the product market. Goods vary 
with respect to both price and some nonprice characteristic, quality. Consumers 
are imperfectly informed about the specific price-quality pairs offered by indivi- 
dual firms. For a given cost they can, however, draw samples from the market 
distribution and observe price prior to consumption. Formal definitions and 
assumptions regarding this search environment follow. 
Each good is described by a pair (p, q)  where p is price and q is quality. The net 
utility to the consumer obtained by purchasing a good at price p with quality q is 
U(p, q). Each good has a lifetime of s periods. 
ASSUMPTION1: U is differentiable and bounded on R+x R+with dU(p, q)/ 
dp <0 and dU(p, q)/dq >0. 
Let 4 (p ,  q)  be the joint probability density function defining the market dis- 
tribution of P and Q and g(qlp) be the conditional probability density function of 
Q given P =p. 
ASSUMPTION2: 4(p ,  q)  >0 for all (p, q)  E [0, pl x R+where p >o . ~  
The cost of drawing an observation at random from 4 and observing price is c. The 
cost of returning to a specific firm and repurchasing a given good is r. Both c and r 
are measured in the same units as U. To keep the search problem nontrivial, 
assume the following: 
ASSUMPTION3 : E[U(P, Q)] >c 3 r 30. 
The objective of the consumer is to maximize his or her discounted sum of utility 
of consumption, net of search costs. As many observations as are desired may be 
taken from 4 at the beginning of each period but at most one unit of the good is 
demanded per period.4 Sampling is without recall, the horizon is infinite, and the 
discount rate is p, 0 <p <1. 
A "price-compensated" increase in durability is one in which the per-period net utility associated 
with a particular price-quality combination is indepepdent of the durability of the good. See Section 5 
and footnote 10. 
It turns out to be convenient to assume 4 ( p ,q)  >0 on [0, p] x R+and to assume p is finite. Neither 
assumption is crucial. 
There are two kinds of "search" in this model. Inspection consists of drawing observations from q5 
and observing P.Evaluation is the subsequent purchase of a good and the observation of Q. Inspection 
is assumed to be a timeless activity, the only cost is the direct sampling cost, c. Evaluation is assumed to 
take time. This means that two types of costs are associated with evaluation; the opportunity cost of 
consuming at a low quality level and the postponement into the future of the possibility of rectifying the 
purchase of a poor quality good. Inspection is assumed to be a timeless activity in order to isolate the 
latter. 
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The consumer therefore faces the following problem. He or she knows 4. By 
paying c an observation can be drawn from this distribution, say (po, qo). The 
consumer observes only po; information regarding qo is provided by the condi- 
tional distribution of Q given po. Based on this distribution the consumer must 
decide whether or not to purchase the good. In the absence of any constraints on 
4 ,  there is no definite relationship between price and the expected long-run utility 
from purchasing the good. For example, if there is a strong positive correlation 
between price and quality then the consumer might reject low prices and search 
out higher ones. If this positive correlation is weak enough (or, in general, 
nonexistent) then low prices will be preferred to high prices. Another possibility is 
disjoint intervals of acceptable prices separated by ranges of unacceptable prices. 
For the sake of discussion, assume that P and Q are positively correlated, but that 
low prices are preferred to high systematically. In this case, if po (the observed 
price) is low enough, then the consumer may decide to purchase the good. 
Otherwise it is rejected and another observation from 4 is drawn. If the good is 
purchased, the consumer receives U(po, qo) over the s period lifetime of the good. 
At the end of s periods the consumer can either pay r and repurchase (po, qo), or 
another sample can be drawn from 4 at cost c.' In general there will be a positive 
probability of the consumer not being satisfied with qo (after purchase) since there 
will be ranges of price for which the conditional expected utility of consumption is 
high enough to warrant purchase even though there is a possibility of being 
disappointed. Given a little more structure on 4 it is possible to show that under 
an optimal policy the initial purchase decision is based on some critical value of P, 
and the decision whether or not to repurchase a particular price-quality pair is 
based on a critical value of Q. That is, the optimal strategy is characterized by a 
pair (8, q*(p)) where 5 is a reservation price level and q*(p) is a reservation 
quality level. 
3. THE OPTIMAL POLICY: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF 
A RESERVATION PRICE 
Let v(p) be the expected discounted sum of utility (net of search costs) 
generated by an optimal policy when an observation of p has just been drawn. 
Define V as the expected value of o(p)  taken with respect to the marginal 
distribution of p ;  that is, 
where f (p)  is defined by 
(2) f ( p )=[m d ( ~ .4) dq. 
0 
' It is implicit that price and quality combinations are such that it never pays to throw away a poor 
quality good and initiate new inspection prior to the end of the s period lifetime of the good. Also, since 
inspection is timeless, it never pays to draw new samples from 4 (in the event that (pa, q ~ )  is a poor 
price-quality pair) until the end of s periods. 
1269 INSPECTION AND EVALUATION 
Since the consumer follows an optimal strategy, v(p) is defined by 
where B (p )  is the expected discounted sum of utility generated by an optimal 
policy conditional on buying the good priced at p. The logic of (3) is that the 
consumer must pay c to observe p. If p is an acceptable price, then v(p)  = 
-c +B(p). If p is not acceptable then a new draw is taken from q!J and the expected 
utility of searching, V, is received; v(p)  = -c + V. 
Next consider B(p).  If the consumer purchases the good after observing p, then 
the expected utility of consumption (net of price) during the next s periods is 
where g( . Ip) is the conditional probability density function of Q given P =p. At 
the end of s periods the consumer can either repurchase the good or draw a new 
sample from 4. The decision is clearly based on the observed value of Q. If the 
consumer repurchases the good, [U(p, q)  -r] is received every s periods (if a 
repurchase is made once after observing Q, it will always pay to repurchase). If the 
consumer samples again V is received. Therefore, define q*(p) by 
Thus q*(p) is that quality level which makes the consumer indifferent between 
repurchasing a good with characteristics (p, q*(p)) and sampling again. Note that 
if (5) has an interior solution then Assumption 1implies q*(p) is unique. But there 
may be values of P such that V ( l -  p" <[U(p, 0) - r] or it may be that V(1- 
p s )>lim,,,[U(p, q)- r]. In the former case define q*(p) = 0 and in the latter let 
q*(p) =a.Then when q*(p) = a it must be that 
(6) v 3 (1 -ps)-'[lim U(p, q)  - r], 
4-rn 
and when q*(p) = 0 it must be that 
(7) v6 (1- 0) r].p " ) - ' [ ~ ( ~ ,  -
Since aU(p, q)/aq >O, we have that q <q*(p) implies the consumer re-
samples, and q 3q*(p) implies the consumer repurchases. Hence the probability 
that the consumer samples again after s periods is G(q*(p)lp), and the probability 
the consumer repurchases the original good is [ I  -G(q*(p)lp)], where G( Ip) is 
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the cumulative density function associated with g(  . Ip). Therefore B ( p )  is defined 
by 
(8) B (p )  =E[U(p,  Q)I + P s { ~ ( q * ( p ) p )  v 
Using (8) in equation (3), the basic functional equation associated with the 
consumer's problem can be written as 
Before analyzing (9) in more detail, one would normally show that it has a unique 
solution. Establishing existence is trivial. Uniqueness and continuity are more 
difficult. Since the focus here is not on these technical details, though, they will 
simply be assumed to hold. 
ASSUMPTION4: There exists a unique, continuous, bounded solution to the 
functional equation (9).6 
In the present setting, this assumption is not as strong as it might seem. It only 
establishes that for any observed price there is a determinate solution to accepting 
or rejecting the associated good and that V is unique and can thus be treated as a 
constant. It does not imply the reservation price is unique.7 
There are two natural sets of sufficient conditions for the reservation price to be 
unique in this model. One is B(0) V and dB(p)/dp <0 for all p in [0, p]. The 
other is B(0) 6 V and dB(p)/dp >0 for all p in [0, p]. In the former case low 
prices are acceptable and high prices are not, while in the latter case the opposite is 
true. Both cases are consistent with the notion that higher quality is associated 
with higher price. Here this translates as aG(qlp)/ap <0;  the probability that 
quality is less than some given q falls as price rises, or higher price implies that "on 
average" quality is higher. But it is the combination of price and quality which is 
important; the distribution of U(p, q)  is what matters to the consumer. 
Let q*(w, p)  be the value of q which sets U(p, 4) = w. Then aq*/ap = -U1/ U2 > 
0. Define ?P(wlp) as the cumulative density function of w = U(p, q)  conditional 
For a proof of this result when inspection is not timeless, see Wilde [lo]. A general proof in the 
timeless case is provided by MacQueen and Miller [S].
'It would be straightforward to generalize this model to one in which both very low prices and very 
high prices are rejected. The analysis would be more complicated but the qualitative results would be 
the same. The primary difference would be that instead of presenting these results in terms of the 
reservation price, they would be presented in terms of the set of acceptable prices (which would have 
both upper and lower bounds). 
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on P =p. Then T(wlp) = G(d(w, p)lp), and 
With aG(q^lp)/ap <0 it is not possible to sign aT(wlp)/ap since both g(q^lp) and 
adlap are positive. In general one would expect aT (w  Ip)/ap >0. That is, a higher 
price should denote lower expected utility for any good within a generic class. This 
is the case, for example, when price and quality are independent. In the absence of 
an equilibrium model which generates 4 endogenously, or of a more precise 
specification of what "quality" means, independence may be a reasonable work- 
ing assumption, especially since the crucial property is not aG(qlp)/ap < O  but 
rather aly(wlp)/ap >0. For now we simply posit the following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION U(p, 0) and p E [O, p].5:  atu(wlp)/ap >0 for all w 2 
LEMMA1: Assume Assumptions 1 through 5 hold. Then dB(p)/dp <0 for all 
P E [O,81. 
PROOF:From (8), integrating by parts, using T(wlp), and defining G(p)  = 
U(p, 0) and G(p) = lim,,,U(p, q), B (p )  can be written as 
G ( P )  
(11) ~ ( p )( i - p s ) - l ~ ( ~ ) - J= t (w l p )  dw 
* ( P )  
piwip, dw]. 
Differentiating (11) with respect to p, 
Thus, aly(w lp)/ap >0 implies dB(p)/dp <0. Q.E.D. 
LEMMA2 : Assume Assumptions 1 through 5 hold. Then (i) B(0) > V iff c >0 
and (ii) B(0) = Viff c =0. 
PROOF:(i) Assume c >0 and B(0) s V. Then, since dB(p)/dp <0 for all 
p E [0, PI, B (p )  S V for all p E [O, PI. Hence max {V, B(p)} = V and v (p )= 
-c + V for all p E [0, p]. Integrating with respect to p then gives V = -c + V, or 
c =0 which is a contradiction. Hence c >0 implies B (0) > V. 
Next let B(O)> V. Then either B ( p ) >  V for all p E[O, 81 or there exists 
[ E  (0, p] such that B([)= V. In the former case max{V, B(p)}= B (p )  for all 
p E [0, p] and hence c =E[B(P)]- V >0. In the latter case 
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where f is the marginal probability density function of P. Since B (p )  > V for all 
p E [O, 6) and 6>0, this again implies c >0. Hence B(0) > V implies c >0. 
(ii) From part (i) we know c =0 implies B(0) S V; but B(0) < V contradicts the 
assumption that E[U(P,  Q)]> c. Hence c =0 implies B(0) = V.That B(0) = V 
implies c =0 follows as above. Q.E.D. 
Given Lemmas 1and 2, the following theorem can be stated without proof. 
THEOREM1:Assume Assumptions 1 through 5 hold. Then either B (p )  > V for 
al lp E [0,p ]  or there exists a unique 6E [O, p]  such that B(6)  = V. Moreover 6=0 if 
and only if c =0. 
Since 5 is a reservation price, the optimal strategy for the consumer in this 
problem is analogous to simple search models; the consumer draws observations 
from q5 (effectively draws of p from f (p) )  until one less than or equal to 6 is found. 
In the simple problem the consumer would buy the homogeneous good at price p 
in all subsequent periods. Here, because goods are heterogeneous with respect to 
quality, the consumer buys the good just once, until quality can be evaluated. If q 
is less than q*(p), then the consumer draws again from q5 but 6 does not change. 
4. PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL POLICY 
The optimal policy of the consumer is summarized in two variables and two 
equations (assuming 6 <p) :  
With some manipulation of these two equations, comparative statics are reason- 
ably straightforward. In particular, d(/dc >O; as search costs rise so does the 
reservation price. Moreover, dq*(p)/dc < O  so, that higher direct search costs 
implies less e~a lua t ion .~  Neither of these results is surprising though. More 
interesting results concern the relationship of acceptable prices to acceptable 
quality levels. 
THEOREM2 : 6 E [0, p )  implies q "(6) >0. 
This is a conditional reduction in evaluation. The ex ante expected probability of not repurchasing 
a good is 
Since d[ /dc  >0 and dq*(p) /dc<0,  it is not possible to sign dr /dc  
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PROOF: With 5E [0, p) ,  it must be that B(8) = V.  The claim is that q*(t)  >0. 
Assume the opposite. Then by definition 
By assumption, though, V is given as 
Using q*(t)  =0, this can be written as 
(17) ~ = ( 1-P")-'{E[U(~, Q)]-P"}. 
From (15) we have, then, that q*(t)  =0 implies 
Clearly there is a contradiction here (even if r =0) since 0 is the minimum quality 
associated with any price. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2 says that quality is never irrelevant when price matters. That is, if it 
pays to set a reservation price strictly less than p, then at that reservation price 
(and in a neighborhood of it) it pays to reject some quality levels. The theorem 
does not imply q*(p) >0 for all p s 5. For example, at p =0 it may be optimal to 
accept all quality levels rather than resample. In one sense Theorem 2 is very 
strong: it implies there are no "search" goods regardless of the level of search 
costs. In fact, if c =0, then 5=0, but q*(O) is not necessarily infinite. The following 
corollary demonstrates that if r +0 as c +0 (certainly the case when c 3 r for all c 
and r), then q*(O) is finite. 
COROLLARY1: Let c =0 = r. Then 0 <q*(O)=q*(t)<a. 
PROOF: When c =0, then B(0) = V. Hence 0 is the optimal price and g (  . 10) is 
the optimal distribution from which to draw quality samples. The proof of 
Theorem 2 then applies with 5=0, yielding q*(t)  =q*(O)> 0. To see that 
q*(O)<a again assume the opposite. Then by definition (and given r =0), V 2 
(1 -/3")-'[1imq,,~(0, q)]. But V =B(0) implies V =E[U(O, Q)] + P V .  Hence 
E[U(O, Q)] 2 lim,,mU(O, q), which is clearly a contradiction when aU/aq >0. 
Thus, q*(O) is finite. Q.E.D. 
If r remained positive as c +0,  then it might pay to always resample since 
repurchase involves the cost r. But this is a silly assumption when c =0. Corollary 
1describes the case analyzed by Nelson [6]; the only relevant "search costs" are 
the opportunity costs of consuming at a low quality level. Hence when c = 0 = r 
goods are truly experience goods in the sense that Nelson uses that term, but to get 
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to this case it is not only necessary that the cost of direct sampling of quality be 
high (in this model it is infinite), it is also necessary that the cost of observing price 
be zero.9 
COROLLARY2: IfB(p)  = V, then q*(e) =q*(p)>0. 
PROOF: The proof of Theorem 2 applies directly. Q.E.D. 
In effect Corollary 2 demonstrates that when direct search costs are high the 
good may be an "experience" good; the consumer ignores price and samples until 
a satisfactory quality level is found. The quality level which is acceptable is not 
independent of price, though. That is, if e = p  then for some prices q*(p) 
must exceed 0 and, in any case, is still sensitive to the observed price-there is no 
"reservation" quality independent of price. 
To summarize, then, consider first c =0 = r. In this case 6 =0 (the lowest price) 
and only quality matters. The consumer sets a reservation quality q* =q*(O)= 
q*([) and samples from g( . 10) until a quality level which beats q* is found. Next 
let c 2 r >0. Assume 0 <6 <p. In this case it may or may not be true that q*(p) >0 
for any given acceptable price ( p  G 6); for some prices all quality levels may be 
acceptable. But q*(6) >0; at themargin it always pays to allow for the possibility 
of rejecting some quality levels. As c rises, so does 6. Eventually 6 =p ,  the 
maximum price, and all prices are acceptable. In this case goods are experience 
goods in the sense that any price is acceptable, but acceptable quality levels are 
still sensitive to the observed price; that is, q*(p) is sensitive to the observed 
price, p. 
It would next be desirable to get comparative statics with respect to s. But as the 
model stands there is no way to let s change without changing the net utility per 
period obtained from a given purchase. One way around this is to let U(p, q)  be 
linear in p and adjust prices to keep per period utility constant when s changes. 
This is taken up in the next section. 
5. DURABILITY: CHANGES IN S 
In order to make comparisons between goods with different durabilities, it is 
necessary to control for the flow of utility obtained by paying particular prices. Let 
the net utility of purchase be linear in price and assume 
where b ( s ) = ~ ; = 1 ~ ' - ' .  At any given price-quality pair, the difference in the 
purchase of a good with duration s and one with duration s + 1 is P"u(q) -p]. 
Kohn and Shavell[2] have also considered this case. But in their model, as in Nelson's, the cost of 
search is either defined to include the foregone opportunity cost of consuming at a low quality level or it 
is not-there is no possibility for the consumer to decide. 
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Hence in the absence of repurchase costs the total discounted "cost" of maintain- 
ing a per-period flow of utility u(qo)when the pair (po ,q,) has been drawn from 4 
is independent of the durability of the good. This will be referred to as a 
"price-compensated" increase in durability.10 
This section deals with the effects of changes in durability so all relevant 
functions and variables will be indexed by s. Thus by definition 
and using (20), 
COMMENT1:Assuming U( p ,  q )  is defined as in (20),an increase in s has two 
effects when r>O; since repurchase is postponed into the future the cost of 
observing a low value of Q is increased, but at the same time the repurchase cost, r, 
is paid less often. When r =0 , then for any s 2 1, V ,  > V,+I.For large r, though, 
V ,< Vs+l .In fact, it can be proven formally that for any s 1 there exists 
r*(s)>0,  such that r<r*(s) implies V ,> V,+I, r = r*(s)implies V,= V,+I,and 
r>r*(s)implies V,< V,+I. 
While Comment 1 is not trivial to prove, it is quite intuitive. The more 
interesting results concern 5, and q: (p)." 
THEOREM3: Suppose V s ( l  - P S )<  ~ , + ~ ( 1  some s a 1. Then ( i )  -@+I) for 
q: ( p )<q;+l ( p )  for all p E [O,D l  and (ii) & atSclwith strict inequality if <D. 
PROOF: Using the definition of q: (5,) and the fact that V ,=B,((,), one can 
derive the following condition in qT (5,) after integrating B,([,) by parts: 
Now suppose that Ss Then using (23) it can be shown that q:([s)> 
q;+l (&+I).  But dq: ( p ) / d p  >0 for all s. Moreover, V,(1- P s )  < V,+l(l-@" I )  
10 There is an obvious problem with simply assuming U(p,q ) is received over s + 1periods instead 
of s periods-V, > would generally hold due simply to the decrease in the per-period utility 
associated with increased durability. The special form of U(p,q) used in this section eliminates this 
.'confounding" effect. 
11 It would be useful to know the relationship between r*(s)and c.Since it is natural to assume c s r, 
the condition r* ( s )>c would imply that V, > V,+l for all feasible r. However, I have not been able to 
establish any precise results in this regard. 
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implies q,"cl ( p )  >qT ( p )  by definition. Hence it must be that 5,a (see Figure 
I ) ,  contradicting the assumption that 5, Q.E.D. 
FIGURE 1-Form of q$ ( p ) and qLl( p ) ,  
THEOREM4: Suppose Vs(l- P S )  > V,+l(l- p e l )  for some s 3 1. Then ( i )  
q: ( p )>q:+l ( p )  for all p E [0,P ] and ( i i )  5, a tstlwith strict inequality i f  <p. 
The proof of Theorem 4 requires the following lemma. 
LEMMA3: Suppo~eVs(l- P S ) >  V,+I(I-PS+' )  forsome s a 1. Then dB , (p ) / dp  
is negative and decreasing in s. 
PROOFOF LEMMA3: From (11)we have 
Now a$(wlp)/ap>O so that dB,(p) /dp<O. But as s rises, Vs( l -PS)falls, 
implying dB, (p ) /dp  falls as s rises. Q.E.D. 
PROOFOF THEOREM4: With Vs(l- P S )  > Vs+l(l-@" I ) ,  then by definition 
q:(p)>q?+l ( p ) .  Consider part (ii), and assume 4, In this case Figure 2 
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illustrates B,(p) and B,+l(p).Clearly when Lemma 3 holds B,(p)-B,+l(p)< 
V, - V,+l for p s ( s+ l .  Thus B,(p)-Vs< Bs+l(p)-VStl for all p s .$,+I.As in 
equation (4), 
FIGURE2.-Proof of Theorem 4. 
Consider (24) when durability is s + 1; [, rises as does B,(p)- V,. But B,(p)-
V, 2 0  on [0, 5,]. Hence 6, <[s+l leads to a contradiction and it must be that 
5s 6s+1. Q.E.D. 
Theorems 3 and 4 establish that regardless of whether a price-compensated 
increase in durability is beneficial overall (in the sense of increasing V,), an 
increase in s always causes the reservation price to fall. That is, a price-
compensated increase in durability always induces more search prior to the 
purchase of a good. 
With respect to evaluation, Theorem 3 is ambiguous but Theorem 4 shows that 
if repurchase costs are low enough then a price-compensated increase in dura- 
bility reduces the e.x ante expected probability of not repurchasing a good, 
conditional on its price being less than or equal to the reservation price.12 Hence if 
Vs(l-P"> V,+l(l-pel), then the price-compensated increase in durability 
increases search but reduces evaluation. If Vs(l-PS)< Vs+l(l-@"+I )  then search 
still increases, but evaluation might increase as well. 
l 2See footnote 8. 
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These results are counter to Nelson's assertion that there will be "larger sample 
sizes for search for nondurable goods than for search for durable goods" [6, p. 
3181. However, this can be partially explained by the restriction of Theorems 3 
and 4 to price-compensated increases in durability. For example, the theorems 
should not be interpreted as implying there will be more search for toaster ovens 
than lettuce because toaster ovens have longer lifetimes. They do imply that if a 
new variety of lettuce appears on the market which when compared to the current 
market variety (a) yields twice as many salads, (b) keeps twice as long in the 
refrigerator, and (c) costs twice as much (on average), then we would expect more 
search for the new variety than the current variety. 
This paper has shown that a number of interesting results can be obtained by 
incorporating the distinction between search characteristics and experience 
characteristics into a formal search model, but at this level of generality, further 
results are difficult (if not impossible) to obtain. It would be interesting to know 
how changes in the distribution of price and quality effect an optimal search 
strategy. Even if one assumes (a) utility is linear and (b) price and quality are 
distributed independently, it is difficult to ascertain the effects on reservation 
prices and reservation qualities of mean-preserving spreads in either distribution. 
However, by making additional assumptions (especially regarding the distribution 
of quality) Lippman and McCall [3] have recently been able to establish some 
results along these lines. 
Other interesting extensions of the model can be obtained by relaxing various 
other assumptions. For example, one could allow quality to be observed prior to 
purchase at some finite cost. As noted in the introduction, this is essentially the 
kind of problem analyzed by MacQueen [4], although he did not allow for 
repurchase. It might also be possible to relax the assumption (stated in footnote 5) 
that it never pays to throw away (or sell) a poor quality good and initiate a new 
round of inspection prior to the end of the good's lifetime. 
California Institute of Technology 
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